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SAVAGE IN THE MARKET
BY FEDERICO ECHENIQUE AND KOTA SAITO1
We develop a behavioral axiomatic characterization of subjective expected utility
(SEU) under risk aversion. Given is an individual agent’s behavior in the market: as-
sume a finite collection of asset purchases with corresponding prices. We show that
such behavior satisfies a “revealed preference axiom” if and only if there exists a SEU
model (a subjective probability over states and a concave utility function over money)
that accounts for the given asset purchases.
KEYWORDS: Revealed preference theory, expected utility, uncertainty.
1. INTRODUCTION
THE MAIN RESULT OF THIS PAPER gives a revealed preference characterization
of risk-averse subjective expected utility. Our contribution is to provide a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for an agent’s market behavior to be consistent
with risk-averse subjective expected utility (SEU).
The meaning of SEU for a preference relation has been well understood
since Savage (1954), but the meaning of SEU for agents’ behavior in the mar-
ket has been unknown until now. Risk-averse SEU is widely used by economists
to describe agents’ market behavior, and the new understanding of risk-averse
SEU provided by our paper is hopefully useful for both theoretical and empir-
ical purposes.
Our paper follows the revealed preference tradition in economics.
Samuelson (1938) and Houthakker (1950) describe the market behaviors that
are consistent with utility maximization. They show that a behavior is con-
sistent with utility maximization if and only if it satisfies the strong axiom of
revealed preference. We show that there is an analogous revealed preference
axiom for risk-averse SEU. A behavior is consistent with risk-averse SEU if
and only if it satisfies the “strong axiom of revealed subjective expected utility”
(SARSEU). (In the following, we write SEU to mean risk-averse SEU when
there is no potential for confusion.)
The motivation for our exercise is twofold. In the first place, there is a the-
oretical payoff from understanding the behavioral counterpart to a theory. In
the case of SEU, we believe that SARSEU gives meaning to the assumption
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ences in Bocconi University, Caltech, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Princeton University, RUD 2014
(Warwick), University of Queensland, University of Melbourne, Larry Epstein, Eddie Dekel,
Mark Machina, Massimo Marinacci, Fabio Maccheroni, John Quah, Ludovic Renou, Kyoung-
won Seo, and Peter Wakker for comments. We are particularly grateful to the editor and three
anonymous referees for their suggestions. The discussion of state-dependent utility and proba-
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of SEU in a market context. The second motivation for the exercise is that
SARSEU can be used to test for SEU in actual data. We discuss each of these
motivations in turn.
SARSEU gives meaning to the assumption of SEU in a market context. We
can, for example, use SARSEU to understand how SEU differs from maxmin
expected utility (Section 6). The difference between the SEU and maxmin util-
ity representations is obvious, but the difference in the behaviors captured by
each model is much harder to grasp. In fact, we show that SEU and maxmin
expected utility are indistinguishable in some situations. In a similar vein, we
can use SARSEU to understand the behavioral differences between SEU and
probabilistic sophistication (Section 5). Finally, SARSEU helps us understand
how SEU restricts behavior over and above what is captured by the more gen-
eral model of state-dependent utility (Section 4). The Supplemental Material
(Echenique and Saito (2015)) discusses additional theoretical implications.
Our results allow one to test SEU nonparametrically in an important eco-
nomic decision-making environment, namely that of choices in financial mar-
kets. The test does not only dictate what to look for in the data (SARSEU),
but it also suggests experimental designs. The syntax of SARSEU may not im-
mediately lend itself to a practical test, but there are two efficient algorithms
for checking the axiom. One of them is based on linearized “Afriat inequal-
ities” (see Lemma 7 in Appendix A). The other is implicit in Proposition 2.
SARSEU is on the same computational standing as the strong axiom of re-
vealed preference.
Next, we describe data one can use to test SARSEU. There are experiments
of decision-making under uncertainty where subjects make financial decisions,
such as Hey and Pace (2014), Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2014), or Bossaerts,
Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and Zame (2010). Hey and Pace, and Ahn et al.
test SEU parametrically: they assume a specific functional form. A nonpara-
metric test, such as SARSEU, seems useful because it frees the analysis from
such assumptions. Bossaerts et al. (2010) do not test SEU itself; they test an
implication of SEU on equilibrium prices and portfolio choices.
The paper by Hey and Pace fits our framework very well. They focus on the
explanatory power of SEU relative to various other models, but they do not
test how well SEU fits the data. Our test, in contrast, would evaluate goodness
of fit and, in addition, be free of parametric assumptions.
The experiments by Ahn et al. and Bossaerts et al. do not fit the setup in our
paper because they assume that the probability of one state is known. In an
extension of our results to a generalization of SEU (see Appendix B), we show
how a version of SARSEU characterizes expected utility when the probabilities
of some states are objective and known. Hence, the results in our paper are
readily applicable to the data from Ahn et al. and Bossaerts et al. We discuss
this application further in Appendix B.
SARSEU is not only useful for testing SEU with existing experimental data,
but it also guides the design of new experiments. In particular, SARSEU sug-
gests how one should choose the parameters of the design (prices and budgets)
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so as to evaluate SEU. For example, in a setting with two states, one could
choose each of the configurations described in Section 3.1 to evaluate where
violations of SEU come from: state-dependent utility or probabilistic sophisti-
cation.
Related Literature
The closest precedent to our paper is the important work of Epstein (2000).
Epstein’s setup is the same as ours; in particular, he assumes data on state-
contingent asset purchases, and that probabilities are subjective and unob-
served but stable. We differ in that he focuses attention on pure probabilis-
tic sophistication (with no assumptions on risk aversion), while our paper is
on risk-averse SEU. Epstein presents a necessary condition for market behav-
ior to be consistent with probabilistic sophistication. Given that the model of
probabilistic sophistication is more general than SEU, one expects that the two
axioms may be related: Indeed we show in Section 5 that Epstein’s necessary
condition can be obtained as a special case of SARSEU. We also present an
example of data that are consistent with a risk-averse probabilistically sophis-
ticated agent, but that violate SARSEU.
Polisson and Quah (2013) develops tests for models of decision under risk
and uncertainty, including SEU (without the requirement of risk aversion).
They develop a general approach by which testing a model amounts to solv-
ing a system of (nonlinear) Afriat inequalities. See also Bayer, Bose, Polisson,
and Renou (2012), who study different models of ambiguity by way of Afriat
inequalities. Nonlinear Afriat inequalities can be problematic because there is
no known efficient algorithm for deciding if they have a solution.
Another strain of related work deals with objective expected utility, as-
suming observable probabilities. The papers by Green and Srivastava (1986),
Varian (1983, 1988), and Kubler, Selden, and Wei (2014) characterize the data
sets that are consistent with objective expected utility theory. Data sets in these
papers are just like ours, but with the added information of probabilities over
states. Green and Srivastava allow for the consumption of many goods in each
state, while we focus on monetary payoffs. Varian’s and Green and Srivastava’s
characterization is in the form of Afriat inequalities; Kubler et al. improve on
these by presenting a revealed preference axiom. We discuss the relation be-
tween their axiom and SARSEU in the Supplemental Material.
The syntax of SARSEU is similar to the main axiom in Fudenberg, Iijima,
and Strzalecki (2014) and in other works on additively separable utility.
2. SUBJECTIVE EXPECTED UTILITY
Let S be a finite set of states. We occasionally use S to denote the num-
ber |S| of states. Let Δ++ = {μ ∈ RS++|
∑S
s=1 μs = 1} denote the set of strictly
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positive probability measures on S. In our model, the objects of choice are
state-contingent monetary payoffs, or monetary acts. A monetary act is a vec-
tor in RS+.
We use the following notational conventions: For vectors x y ∈ Rn, x ≤ y
means that xi ≤ yi for all i = 1     n; x < y means that x ≤ y and x = y; and
x y means that xi < yi for all i= 1     n. The set of all x ∈ Rn with 0 ≤ x is
denoted by Rn+ and the set of all x ∈Rn with 0  x is denoted by Rn++.
DEFINITION 1: A data set is a finite collection of pairs (xp) ∈RS+ ×RS++.
The interpretation of a data set (xkpk)Kk=1 is that it describes K purchases
of a state-contingent payoff xk at some given vector of prices pk and income
pk · xk.
A subjective expected utility (SEU) model is specified by a subjective prob-
ability μ ∈ Δ++ and a utility function over money u : R+ → R. An SEU maxi-
mizing agent solves the problem
max
x∈B(pI)
∑
s∈S
μsu(xs)(1)
when faced with prices p ∈ RS++ and income I > 0. The set B(p I)= {y ∈ RS+ :
p · y ≤ I} is the budget set defined by p and I.
A data set is our notion of observable behavior. The meaning of SEU as
an assumption, is the behaviors that are as if they were generated by an SEU
maximizing agent. We call such behaviors SEU rational.
DEFINITION 2: A data set (xkpk)Kk=1 is subjective expected utility rational
(SEU rational) if there is μ ∈ Δ++ and a concave and strictly increasing func-
tion u :R+ →R such that, for all k,
y ∈ B(pkpk · xk) ⇒ ∑
s∈S
μsu(ys)≤
∑
s∈S
μsu
(
xks
)

Three remarks are in order. First, we restrict attention to concave (i.e., risk-
averse) utility and our results will have nothing to say about the nonconcave
case. In the second place, we assume that the relevant budget for the kth ob-
servation is B(pkpk · xk). Implicit is the assumption that pk · xk is the rele-
vant income for this problem. This assumption is somewhat unavoidable and is
standard procedure in revealed preference theory. Third, we should emphasize
that there is in our model only one good (which we think of as money) in each
state. The problem with many goods is interesting, but beyond the methods
developed in the present paper (see Remark 4).
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3. A CHARACTERIZATION OF SEU RATIONAL DATA
In this section, we introduce the axiom for SEU rationality and state our
main result. We start by deriving, or calculating, the axiom in a specific in-
stance. In this derivation, we assume (for ease of exposition) that u is differen-
tiable. In general, however, an SEU rational data set may not be rationalizable
using a differentiable u; see Remark 3 below.
The first-order conditions for SEU maximization (1) are
μsu
′(xs)= λps(2)
The first-order conditions involve three unobservables: subjective probabil-
ity μs, marginal utilities u′(xs), and Lagrange multipliers λ.
3.1. The 2 × 2 Case: K = 2 and S = 2
We illustrate our analysis with a discussion of the 2 × 2 case, the case when
there are two states and two observations. In the 2 × 2 case, we can easily see
that SEU has two kinds of implications and, as we explain in Sections 4 and 5,
each kind is derived from a different qualitative feature of SEU.
Let us impose the first-order conditions (2) on a data set. Let (xk1pk1),
(xk2pk2) be a data set with K = 2 and S = 2. For the data set to be SEU
rational there must exist μ ∈ Δ++, (λk)k=k1k2 , and a concave function u such
that each observation in the data set satisfies the first-order conditions (2).
That is,
μsu
′(xks )= λkpks(3)
for s = s1 s2, and k= k1k2.
Equation (3) involves the observed x and p, as well as the unobservables u′,
λ, and μ. One is free to choose (subject to some constraints) the unobserv-
ables to satisfy (3). We can understand the implications of (3) by considering
situations in which the unobservable λ and μ cancel out:
u′
(
xk1s1
)
u′
(
xk2s1
) u′(xk2s2 )
u′
(
xk1s2
) = μs1u′
(
xk1s1
)
μs1u
′(xk2s1 )
μs2u
′(xk2s2 )
μs2u
′(xk1s2 ) =
λk1pk1s1
λk2pk2s1
λk2pk2s2
λk1pk1s2
= p
k1
s1
pk2s1
pk2s2
pk1s2
(4)
Equation (4) is obtained by dividing first-order conditions to eliminate terms
involving μ and λ: this allows us to constrain the observable variables x and p.
There are two situations of interest.
Suppose first that xk1s1 > x
k2
s1
and that xk2s2 > x
k1
s2
. The concavity of u implies
then that u′(xk1s1 )≤ u′(xk2s1 ) and u′(xk2s2 )≤ u′(xk1s2 ). This means that the left-hand
side of (4) is smaller than 1. Thus,
xk1s1 > x
k2
s1
and xk2s2 > x
k1
s2
⇒ p
k1
s1
pk2s1
pk2s2
pk1s2
≤ 1(5)
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In the second place, suppose that xk1s1 > x
k1
s2
while xk2s2 > x
k2
s1
(so the bundles
xk1 and xk2 are on opposite sides of the 45 degree line in R2). The concavity of
u implies that u′(xk1s1 )≤ u′(xk1s2 ) and u′(xk2s2 )≤ u′(xk2s1 ). The far left of (4) is then
smaller than 1. Thus,
xk1s1 > x
k1
s2
and xk2s2 > x
k2
s1
⇒ p
k1
s1
pk1s2
pk2s2
pk2s1
≤ 1(6)
Requirements (5) and (6) are implications of risk-averse SEU for a data set
when S = 2 and K = 2. We shall see that they are all the implications of risk-
averse SEU in this case and that they capture distinct qualitative components
of SEU (Sections 4 and 5).
3.2. General K and S
We now turn to the general setup and to our main result. First, we shall
derive the axiom by proceeding along the lines suggested above in Section 3.1:
Using the first-order conditions (2), the SEU rationality of a data set requires
that
u′
(
xk
′
s′
)
u′
(
xks
) = μs
μs′
λk
′
λk
pk
′
s′
pks

The concavity of u implies something about the left-hand side of this equa-
tion when xk′s′ > x
k
s , but the right-hand side is complicated by the presence of
unobservable Lagrange multipliers and subjective probabilities. So we choose
pairs (xks  x
k′
s′ ) with x
k
s > x
k′
s′ such that subjective probabilities and Lagrange
multipliers cancel out. For example, consider
xk1s1 > x
k2
s2
 xk3s2 > x
k1
s3
 and xk2s3 > x
k3
s1

By manipulating the first-order conditions, we obtain that
u′
(
xk1s1
)
u′
(
xk2s2
) · u′
(
xk3s2
)
u′
(
xk1s3
) · u′
(
xk2s3
)
u′
(
xk3s1
)
=
(
μs2
μs1
λk1
λk2
pk1s1
pk2s2
)
·
(
μs3
μs2
λk3
λk1
pk3s2
pk1s3
)
·
(
μs1
μs3
λk2
λk3
pk2s3
pk3s1
)
= p
k1
s1
pk2s2
pk3s2
pk1s3
pk2s3
pk3s1

Notice that the pairs (xk1s1 x
k2
s2
), (xk3s2 x
k1
s3
), and (xk2s3 x
k3
s1
) have been chosen so
that the subjective probabilities μs appear in the nominator as many times as
in the denominator, and the same for λk; hence, these terms cancel out. Such
“canceling out” motivates conditions (ii) and (iii) in the axiom below.
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Now the concavity of u and the assumption that xk1s1 > x
k2
s2
, xk3s2 > x
k1
s3
, and
xk2s3 > x
k3
s1
imply that the product of the prices
p
k1
s1
p
k2
s2
p
k3
s2
p
k1
s3
p
k2
s3
p
k3
s1
cannot exceed 1. Thus,
we obtain an implication of SEU on prices, an observable entity.
In general, the assumption of SEU rationality requires that, for any collec-
tion of sequences as above, appropriately chosen so that subjective probabili-
ties and Lagrange multipliers will cancel out, the product of the ratio of prices
cannot exceed 1. The formal statement is the following axiom.
STRONG AXIOM OF REVEALED SUBJECTIVE UTILITY (SARSEU): Assume
any sequence of pairs (xkisi  x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 in which the following statements hold:
(i) We have xkisi > x
k′i
s′i
for all i.
(ii) Each s appears as si (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it
appears as s′i (on the right).
(iii) Each k appears as ki (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it
appears as k′i (on the right).
Then the product of prices satisfies that
n∏
i=1
pkisi
p
k′i
s′i
≤ 1
THEOREM 1: A data set is SEU rational if and only if it satisfies SARSEU.
It is worth noting that the syntax of SARSEU is similar to that of the main
axiom in Kubler, Selden, and Wei (2014), with “risk-neutral” prices playing the
role of prices in the model with objective probabilities. The relation between
the two is discussed further in Appendix B. We conclude this section with some
remarks on Theorem 1. The proof is given in Appendix A.
REMARK 1: In the 2 × 2 case in Section 3.1, requirements (5) and (6) are
equivalent to SARSEU.
REMARK 2: The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix A. It relies on
setting up a system of inequalities from the first-order conditions of an SEU
agent’s maximization problem. This is similar to the approach in Afriat (1967)
and in many other subsequent studies of revealed preference. The difference is
that our system is nonlinear and must be linearized. A crucial step in the proof
is an approximation result, which is complicated by the fact that the unknown
subjective probabilities, Lagrange multipliers, and marginal utilities all take
values in noncompact sets.
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REMARK 3: Under the assumption on the data set,
xks = xk′s′ if (k s) =
(
k′ s′
)

SARSEU implies SEU rationality using a smooth rationalizing u. This condi-
tion on the data set plays a similar role to the assumption used by Chiappori
and Rochet (1987) to obtain a smooth utility using the Afriat construction.
REMARK 4: In our framework we assume choices of monetary acts, which
means that consumption in each state is one-dimensional. Our results are not
easily applicable to the multidimensional setting, essentially because concav-
ity is, in general, equivalent to cyclic monotonicity of supergradients, which
we cannot deal with in our approach. In the one-dimensional case, concavity
requires only that supergradients are monotone. The condition that some un-
known function is monotone is preserved by a monotonic transformation of
the function, but this is not true of cyclic monotonicity. If one sets up the mul-
tidimensional problem as we have done, then one loses the property of cyclic
monotonicity when linearizing the system.
Finally, it is not obvious from the syntax of SARSEU that one can verify
whether a particular data sets satisfies SARSEU in finitely many steps. We
show that not only is SARSEU decidable in finitely many steps, but there is, in
fact, an efficient algorithm that decides whether a data set satisfies SARSEU.
PROPOSITION 2: There is an efficient algorithm that decides whether a data set
satisfies SARSEU.2
We provide a direct proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix C. Proposition 2
can also be seen as a result of Lemma 7 together with the linearization in the
proof of Theorem 1. The resulting linear system can be decided by using linear
programming.
4. STATE-DEPENDENT UTILITY
SEU asserts, among other things, the existence of a (concave) state-
dependent utility (i.e., an additively separable utility across states). SEU re-
quires more, of course, but it is interesting to compare SEU with the weaker
theory of state-dependent utility. We shall trace the assumption of state-
dependent utility to a particular weakening on SARSEU.
The state-dependent utility model says that an agent maximizes Usd(x) =∑
s∈S us(xs), an additively separable utility, for some collection (us)s∈S of con-
cave and strictly increasing state-dependent functions, us :R+ →R. We should
emphasize that here, as in the rest of the paper, we restrict attention to concave
utility.
2Efficient means that the algorithm runs in polynomial time.
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4.1. The 2 × 2 Case: K = 2 and S = 2
We argued in Section 3.1 that requirements (5) and (6) are necessary for
SEU rationality. It turns out that (5) alone captures state-dependent utility.
A data set that violates requirement (5) can be visualized on the left of Fig-
ure 1. The figure depicts choices with xk1s1 > x
k2
s1
and xk2s2 > x
k2
s2
, but where re-
quirement (5) is violated. Figure 1 presents a geometrical argument for why
such a data set is not SEU rational. Suppose, toward a contradiction, that the
data set is SEU rational. Since the rationalizing function u is concave, it is
easy to see that optimal choices must be increasing in the level of income (the
demand function of a risk-averse SEU agent is normal). At the right of Fig-
ure 1, we include a budget with the same relative prices as when xk2 was cho-
sen, but where the income is larger. The larger income is such that the budget
line passes through xk1 . Since her demand is normal, the agent’s choice on the
larger budget must be larger than at xk2 : this is indicated by the dotted lines
in the picture. The choice must lie in the line segment on the larger budget
line that consists of bundles larger than xk2 . But such a choice would violate
the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP). Hence, the (counterfactual)
choice implied by SEU at the larger budget would be inconsistent with util-
ity maximization, contradicting the assumption of SEU rationality. It is useful
to emphasize that requirement (5) is a strengthening of WARP, something we
shall return to below.
So SEU rationality implies (5), which is a strengthening of WARP. Now
we argue that state-dependent utility implies (5) as well. To see this, sup-
pose that the agent maximizes us1(·)+ us2(·), where usi is concave. As in Sec-
tion 3.1, assume that usi is differentiable. Then x
k1
s1
> xk2s1 and x
k2
s2
> xk1s2 imply
that u′s1(x
k1
s1
) ≤ u′s1(xk2s1 ) and u′s2(xk2s2 ) ≤ u′s2(xk1s2 ). The first-order conditions are
xs2
xs1
xk2
xk1
xs2
xs1
xk2
xk1
FIGURE 1.—A violation of requirement (5).
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u′s(x
k
s )= λkpks ; hence,
pk2s1
pk1s1
pk1s2
pk2s2
= u
′
s1
(
xk2s1
)
u′s1
(
xk1s1
) u′s2(xk1s2 )
u′s2
(
xk2s2
) ≤ 1
Indeed, this is requirement (5).
4.2. General K and S
A data set (xkpk)Kk=1 is state-dependent utility (SDU) rational if there is an
additively separable function Usd such that, for all k,
y ∈ B(pkpk · xk) ⇒ Usd(y)≤Usd(xk)
In the 2 × 2 case, we have seen that requirement (5) is necessary for ratio-
nalization by a state-dependent utility. More generally, there is a natural weak-
ening of SARSEU that captures rationalization by a state-dependent utility.
This weakening is strong enough to imply WARP. Concretely, if one substi-
tutes condition (ii) in SARSEU with the statement si = s′i, the resulting axiom
characterizes SDU rationality.
STRONG AXIOM OF REVEALED STATE-DEPENDENT UTILITY (SARSDU):
Assume any sequence of pairs (xkisi  x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 in which the following statements hold:
(i) We have xkisi > x
k′i
s′i
for all i.
(ii) We have si = s′i.
(iii) Each k appears as ki (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it
appears as k′i (on the right).
Then the product of prices satisfies that
n∏
i=1
pkisi
p
k′i
s′i
≤ 1
It should be obvious that SARSEU implies SARSDU. SARSDU is equiva-
lent to SDU rationality.
THEOREM 3: A data set is SDU rational if and only if it satisfies SARSDU.
The proof that SARSDU is necessary for state-dependent utility is simple
and follows along the lines developed in Section 3. The proof of sufficiency is
similar to the proof used for the characterization of SEU and is omitted.
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Note that in the 2 × 2 case, SARSDU and requirement (5) are equivalent.
Hence, (5) characterizes state-dependent utility in the 2 × 2 case.
By Theorem 3 above, we know that SARSDU implies the weak axiom of
revealed preference (WARP), but it may be useful to present a direct proof of
the fact that SARSDU implies WARP.
DEFINITION 3: A data set (xkpk)Kk=1 satisfies WARP if there is no k and k
′
such that pk · xk ≥ pk · xk′ and pk′ · xk′ >pk′ · xk.
PROPOSITION 4: If a data set satisfies SARSDU, then it satisfies WARP.
PROOF: Suppose, toward a contradiction, that a data set (xkpk)Kk=1 satisfies
SARSDU but that it violates WARP. Then there are k and k′ such that pk ·xk ≥
pk · xk′ and pk′ · xk′ > pk′ · xk. It cannot be the case that xks ≥ xk′s for all s, so
the set S1 = {s : xks < xk′s } is nonempty. Choose s∗ ∈ S1 such that
pk
′
s∗
pks∗
≥ p
k′
s
pks
for all s ∈ S1
Now pk · xk ≥ pk · xk′ implies that
(
xks∗ − xk′s∗
)≥ −1
pks∗
∑
s =s∗
pks
(
xks − xk′s
)

We also have that pk′ · xk′ >pk′ · xk, so
0 >
∑
s =s∗
pk
′
s
(
xks − xk′s
)+pk′s∗(xks∗ − xk′s∗)
≥
∑
s =s∗
pk
′
s
(
xks − xk′s
)+ −pk′s∗
pks∗
∑
s =s∗
pks
(
xks − xk′s
)
=
∑
s /∈S1
pk
′
s
(
1 − p
k′
s∗p
k
s
pks∗p
k′
s
)(
xks − xk′s
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
∑
s∈S1\{s∗}
pk
′
s
(
1 − p
k′
s∗p
k
s
pks∗p
k′
s
)(
xks − xk′s
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

We shall prove that A≥ 0 and that B ≥ 0, which will yield the desired contra-
diction.
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For all s /∈ S1, we have that (xks −xk′s )≥ 0. If xks > xk′s , then SARSDU implies
that
pk
′
s∗p
k
s
pks∗p
k′
s
≤ 1
as xks∗ < x
k′
s∗ so that the sequence {(xk′s∗xks∗) (xks  xk′s )} satisfies (i), (ii), and (iii)
in SARSDU. Hence A≥ 0.
Now consider B. By definition of s∗, we have that p
k′
s∗p
k
s
pk
s∗p
k′
s
≥ 1 for all s ∈ S1.
Then (xks − xk′s ) < 0 implies that(
1 − p
k′
s∗p
k
s
pks∗p
k′
s
)(
xks − xk′s
)≥ 0
for all s ∈ S1. Hence B ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
We make use of these results in the Supplemental Material, where we show
how SARSDU and SARSEU rule out violations of Savage’s axioms. The Sup-
plemental Material also includes a condition on the data under which SEU and
SDU are observationally equivalent.
5. PROBABILISTIC SOPHISTICATION
We have looked at the aspects of SARSEU that capture the existence of an
additively separable representation. SEU also affirms the existence of a unique
subjective probability measure guiding the agent’s choices. We now turn to
the behavioral counterpart of the existence of such a probability. We do not
have a characterization of probability sophistication. In this section, we sim-
ply observe how SARSEU and requirement (6) are related to the existence of
a subjective probability.3 We also show how SARSEU is related to Epstein’s
necessary condition for probability sophistication.
5.1. The 2 × 2 Case: K = 2 and S = 2
Consider, as before, the 2 × 2 case: S = 2 and K = 2. We argued in Sec-
tion 3.1 that requirements (5) and (6) are necessary for SEU rationality, and in
Section 4 that requirement (5) captures the existence of a state-dependent rep-
resentation. We now show that requirement (6) results from imposing a unique
subjective probability guiding the agent’s choices.
3In the Supplemental Material, we also show that requirement (6) rules out violations of
Savage’s P4, which captures the existence of a subjective probability (Machina and Schmeidler
(1992)).
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FIGURE 2.—Violation of requirement (6).
Figure 2 exhibits a data set that violates requirement (6). We have drawn the
indifference curve of the agent when choosing xk2 . Recall that the marginal
rate of substitution (MRS) is μs1u
′(xs1)/μs2u
′(xs2). At the point where the in-
difference curve crosses the 45 degree line (dotted), one can read the agent’s
subjective probability off the indifference curve because u′(xs1)/u
′(xs2) = 1
and, therefore, the MRS equals μs1/μs2 . So the tangent line to the indifference
curve at the 45 degree line describes the subjective probability. It is then clear
from the picture that this tangent line must be flatter than the budget line at
which xk2 was chosen. On the other hand, the same reasoning reveals that the
subjective probability must define a steeper line than the budget line at which
xk1 was chosen. This is a contradiction, as the latter budget line is steeper than
the former and tangents to an indifference curve on the 45 degree line must be
parallel.
5.2. General K and S
In the following discussion, we focus instead on the relation with proba-
bilistic sophistication, namely the relation between SARSEU and the axiom in
Epstein (2000). Epstein studies the implications of probabilistic sophistication
for consumption data sets. He considers the same kind of economic environ-
ment as we do and the same notion of a data set. He focuses on probabilistic
sophistication instead of SEU and, importantly, does not assume risk aversion.
Epstein shows that a data set is inconsistent with probabilistic sophistication if
there exist s t ∈ S and k kˆ ∈K such that (i) pks ≥ pkt and pkˆs ≤ pkˆt , with at least
one strict inequality, and (ii) xks > x
k
t and x
kˆ
s < x
kˆ
t .
Of course, an SEU rational agent is probabilistically sophisticated. Indeed,
our next result establishes that a violation of Epstein’s condition implies a vio-
lation of SARSEU.
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PROPOSITION 5: If a data set (xkpk)Kk=1 satisfies SARSEU, then (i) and (ii)
cannot both hold for some s t ∈ S and k kˆ ∈K.
PROOF: Suppose that s t ∈ S and k kˆ ∈ K are such that (ii) holds. Then
{(xks  xkt ) (xkˆt  xkˆs )} satisfies the conditions in SARSEU. Hence, SARSEU re-
quires that p
k
s
pkt
pkˆt
pkˆs
≤ 1, so that pks ≤ pkt or pkˆs ≥ pkˆt . Hence, (i) is violated.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 raises the issue of whether SEU and probabilistic sophistica-
tion are distinguishable. In the following discussion, we show that we can in-
deed distinguish the two models: We present an example of a data set that
violates SARSEU, but that is consistent with a risk-averse probabilistically so-
phisticated agent. Hence the weakening in going from SEU to probabilistic
sophistication has empirical content.
Let S = {s1 s2}. We define a data set as follows. Let xk1 = (22), pk1 = (12),
xk2 = (80), and pk2 = (11). It is clear that the data set violates SARSEU:
xk2s1 > x
k1
s1
and xk1s2 > x
k2
s2
while
pk2s1
pk1s1
pk1s2
pk2s2
= 2 > 1
Observe, moreover, that the data set specifically violates requirement (5),
not (6). Figure 3 on the right illustrates the data set (budget lines are drawn as
thick lines).
We shall now argue that this data set is rationalizable by a risk-averse prob-
abilistically sophisticated agent. Fix μ ∈ Δ++ with μ1 = μ2 = 1/2, a uniform
xs2
xs1
xs2
xs1
pk1
pk2
xk2
xk1
FIGURE 3.—Probabilistically sophisticated violation of SARSEU.
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probability over S. Any vector x ∈ R2+ induces the probability distribution on
R+ given by x1 with probability 1/2 and x2 with probability 1/2. Let Π be the
set of all uniform probability measures on R+ with support having cardinality
smaller than or equal to 2.
We shall define a function V :Π → R that represents a probabilistically so-
phisticated preference and for which the choices in the data set are optimal.4
We construct a monotone increasing and quasiconcave h : R2+ → R+ and then
define V (π) = h(x¯π ¯x
π), where ¯x
π is the smallest point in the support of π
and x¯π is the largest. As a consequence of the monotonicity of h, V represents
a probabilistically sophisticated preference. The preference is also risk-averse.
The function h is constructed so that (x1x2) → h(max{x1x2}min{x1x2})
has the map of indifference curves illustrated on the left in Figure 3. There are
two important features of the indifference curves drawn in the figure. The first
is that indifference curves exhibit a convex preference, which ensures that the
agent will be risk-averse. The second is that indifference curves become “less
convex” as one moves up and to the right in the figure. As a result, the line that
is normal to pk1 supports the indifference curve through xk1 , while the line that
is normal to pk2 supports the indifference curve through xk2 . On the right of
Figure 3 are indifference curves drawn as dashed lines and budget lines drawn
as thick lines. It is clear that the constructed preferences rationalize the choices
in the data set.
6. MAXMIN EXPECTED UTILITY
In this section, we demonstrate one use of our main result to study the dif-
ferences between SEU and maxmin expected utility. We show that SEU and
maxmin are behaviorally indistinguishable in the 2×2 case, but distinguishable
more generally.
The maxmin SEU model, first axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989),
posits that an agent maximizes
min
μ∈M
∑
s∈S
μsu(xs)
where M is a closed and convex set of probabilities. A data set (xkpk)Kk=1 is
maxmin expected utility rational if there is a closed and convex set M ⊆ Δ++,
and a concave and strictly increasing function u :R+ →R such that, for all k,
y ∈ B(pkpk · xk) ⇒ min
μ∈M
∑
s∈S
μsu(ys)≤ min
μ∈M
∑
s∈S
μsu
(
xks
)

Note that we restrict attention to risk-averse maxmin expected utility.
4It is easy to show that there is a probabilistically sophisticated weak order  defined on the
set of all probability measures on R2+ with finite support, such that V represents  on Π. The
details of the example are technical and left to the Supplemental Material.
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PROPOSITION 6: Let S = K = 2. Then a data set is maxmin expected utility
rational if and only if it is SEU rational.
The proof of Proposition 6 is given in the Supplemental Material. The result
in Proposition 6 does not, however, extend beyond the case of two observa-
tions. In the Supplemental Material, we provide an example of data from a
(risk-averse) maxmin expected utility agent that violates SARSEU.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first give three preliminary and auxiliary results. Lemma 7 provides non-
linear Afriat inequalities for the problem at hand. A version of this lemma
appears, for example, in Green and Srivastava (1986), Varian (1983), or Bayer
et al. (2012). Lemmas 8 and 9 are versions of the theorem of the alternative.
LEMMA 7: Let (xkpk)Kk=1 be a data set. The following statements are equiva-
lent:
(i) We have that (xkpk)Kk=1 is SEU rational.
(ii) There are strictly positive numbers vks , λ
k, μs for s = 1     S and k =
1    K such that
μsv
k
s = λkpks  xks > xk′s′ ⇒ vks ≤ vk′s′ (7)
PROOF: We shall prove that (i) implies (ii). Let (xkpk)Kk=1 be SEU rational.
Let μ ∈ RS++ and let u : R+ → R be as in the definition of SEU rational data
set. Then (see, for example, Theorem 28.3 of Rockafellar (1997)) there are
numbers λk ≥ 0, k= 1    K, such that if we let
vks =
λkpks
μs

then vks ∈ ∂u(xks ) if xks > 0, and there is ¯w ∈ ∂u(x
k
s ) with v
k
s ≥ ¯w if x
k
s = 0 (here
we have ∂u(0) = ∅). In fact, since u is strictly increasing, it is easy to see that
λk > 0 and, therefore, vks > 0.
By the concavity of u and the consequent monotonicity of ∂u(xks ) (see Theo-
rem 24.8 of Rockafellar (1997)), if xks > x
k′
s′ > 0, v
k
s ∈ ∂u(xks ), and vk′s′ ∈ ∂u(xk′s′ ),
then vks ≤ vk′s′ . If xks > xk′s′ = 0, then ¯w ∈ ∂u(x
k′
s′ ) with v
k′
s′ ≥ ¯w. So v
k
s ≤ ¯w≤ v
k′
s′ .
In second place, we show that (ii) implies (i). Suppose that the numbers
vks , λ
k, and μs, for s = 1     S and k = 1    K are as in (ii). Enumerate
the elements of X ≡ {xks |k ∈ Ks ∈ S} in increasing order: y1 < y2 < · · · < yn.
Let
¯
yi = min{vks : xks = yi} and y¯i = max{vks : xks = yi}. Let zi = (yi + yi+1)/2,
i= 1     n− 1, z0 = 0, and zn = yn + 1. Let f be a correspondence defined as
f (z)=
⎧⎨
⎩
[
¯
yi y¯i] if z = yi,
max{y¯i : z < yi} if yn > z and ∀i (z = yi),
¯
yn/2 if yn < z.
(8)
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Then, by the assumptions placed on vks and by construction of f , y < y
′, v ∈
f (y) and v′ ∈ f (y ′) imply that v′ ≤ v. Then the correspondence f is monotone
and there exists a concave function u for which ∂u= f (see, e.g., Theorem 24.8
of Rockafellar (1997)). Given that vks > 0, all the elements in the range of f are
positive and, therefore, u is a strictly increasing function.
Finally, for all (k s), λkpks /μs = vks ∈ ∂u(vks ) and, therefore, the first-order
conditions to a maximum choice of x hold at xks . Since u is concave, the
first-order conditions are sufficient. The data set is therefore SEU rational.
Q.E.D.
We shall use the following lemma, which is a version of the theorem of the
alternative. This is Theorem 1.6.1 in Stoer and Witzgall (1970). We shall use it
here in the cases where F is either the real or the rational number field.
LEMMA 8: Let A be an m× n matrix, let B be an l × n matrix, and let E be
an r × n matrix. Suppose that the entries of the matrices A, B, and E belong to a
commutative ordered field F. Exactly one of the following alternatives is true.
(i) There is u ∈ Fn such that A · u= 0, B · u≥ 0, and E · u 0.
(ii) There is θ ∈ Fm, η ∈ Fl, and π ∈ Fr such that θ · A + η · B + π · E = 0,
π > 0 and η≥ 0.
The next lemma is a direct consequence of Lemma 8: see Lemma 12 in
Chambers and Echenique (2014) for a proof.
LEMMA 9: Let A be an m× n matrix, let B be an l × n matrix, and let E be
an r × n matrix. Suppose that the entries of the matrices A, B, and E are rational
numbers. Exactly one of the following alternatives is true.
(i) There is u ∈Rn such that A · u= 0, B · u≥ 0, and E · u 0.
(ii) There is θ ∈Qm, η ∈Ql, and π ∈Qr such that θ ·A+ η · B + π · E = 0,
π > 0 and η≥ 0.
A.1. Necessity
LEMMA 10: If a (xkpk)Kk=1 is SEU rational, then it satisfies SARSEU.
PROOF: Let (xkpk)Kk=1 be SEU rational, and let μ ∈ Δ++ and u :R+ →R be
as in the definition of SEU rational. By Lemma 7, there exists a strictly positive
solution vks , λ
k, μs to the system in statement (ii) of Lemma 7 with vks ∈ ∂u(xks )
when xks > 0 and v
k
s ≥ ¯w ∈ ∂u(x
k
s ) when x
k
s = 0.
Let (xkisi  x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 be a sequence satisfying the three conditions in SARSEU.
Then xkisi > x
k′i
s′i
. Suppose that x
k′i
s′i
> 0. Then vkisi ∈ ∂u(xkisi ) and v
k′i
s′i
∈ ∂u(xk′i
s′i
).
By the concavity of u, it follows that λkiμs′ip
ki
si
≤ λk′iμsipk
′
i
s′i
(see Theorem 24.8
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of Rockafellar (1997)). Similarly, if x
k′i
s′i
= 0, then vkisi ∈ ∂u(xkisi ) and v
k′i
s′i
≥ ¯w ∈
∂u(x
k′i
s′i
). So λkiμs′ip
ki
si
≤ λk′iμsipk
′
i
s′i
. Therefore,
1 ≥
n∏
i=1
λkiμs′ip
ki
si
λk
′
iμsip
k′i
s′i
=
n∏
i=1
pkisi
p
k′i
s′i

as the sequence satisfies conditions (ii) and (iii) of SARSEU, and, hence, the
numbers λk and μs appear the same number of times in the denominator as in
the numerator of this product. Q.E.D.
A.2. Sufficiency
We proceed to prove the sufficiency direction. An outline of the argument
is as follows. We know from Lemma 7 that it suffices to find a solution to the
Afriat inequalities (actually first-order conditions), written as statement (ii) in
the lemma. So we set up the problem to find a solution to a system of linear
inequalities obtained from using logarithms to linearize the Afriat inequalities
in Lemma 7.
Lemma 11 establishes that SARSEU is sufficient for SEU rationality when
the logarithms of the prices are rational numbers. The role of rational loga-
rithms comes from our use of a version the theorem of the alternative (see
Lemma 9): when there is no solution to the linearized Afriat inequalities, then
the existence of a rational solution to the dual system of inequalities implies a
violation of SARSEU. The bulk of the proof goes into constructing a violation
of SARSEU from a given solution to the dual.
The next step in the proof (Lemma 12) establishes that we can approximate
any data set satisfying SARSEU with a data set for which the logarithms of
prices are rational and for which SARSEU is satisfied. This step is crucial, and
somewhat delicate. One might have tried to obtain a solution to the Afriat
inequalities for “perturbed” systems (with prices that are rational after taking
logs) and then considered the limit. This does not work because the solutions
to our systems of inequalities are in a noncompact space. It is not clear how
to establish that the limits exist and are well behaved. Lemma 12 avoids the
problem.
Finally, Lemma 13 establishes the result by using another version of the the-
orem of the alternative, stated as Lemma 8 above.
The statement of the lemmas follow. The rest of the paper is devoted to the
proof of these lemmas.
LEMMA 11: Let data set (xkpk)kk=1 satisfy SARSEU. Suppose that log(p
k
s ) ∈
Q for all k and s. Then there are numbers vks , λ
k, μs for s = 1     S and k =
1    K satisfying (7) in Lemma 7.
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LEMMA 12: Let data set (xkpk)kk=1 satisfy SARSEU. Then for all positive
numbers ε¯, there exists qks ∈ [pks − ε¯pks ] for all s ∈ S and k ∈ K such that
logqks ∈Q and the data set (xkqk)kk=1 satisfy SARSEU.
LEMMA 13: Let data set (xkpk)kk=1 satisfy SARSEU. Then there are numbers
vks , λ
k, μs for s = 1     S and k= 1    K satisfying (7) in Lemma 7.
A.2.1. Proof of Lemma 11
We linearize the equation in system (7) of Lemma 7. The result is
logvks + logμs − logλk − logpks = 0(9)
xks > x
k′
s′ ⇒ logvks ≤ logvk′s′ (10)
In the system comprised by (9) and (10), the unknowns are the real numbers
logvks , logμs, and logλ
k for k= 1    K and s = 1     S.
First, we are going to write the system of inequalities (9) and (10) in matrix
form.
We shall define a matrix A such that there are positive numbers vks , λ
k, and
μs the logs of which satisfy (9) if and only if there is a solution u ∈ RK×S+K+S+1
to the system of equations
A · u= 0
and for which the last component of u is strictly positive.
Let A be a matrix with K × S rows and K × S+ S+K + 1 columns, defined
as follows: We have one row for every pair (k s), one column for every pair
(k s), one column for every s, one column for each k, and one last column.
In the row corresponding to (k s), the matrix has zeroes everywhere with the
following exceptions: it has a 1 in the column for (k s); it has a 1 in the column
for s; it has a −1 in the column for k; it has − logpks in the very last column.
Matrix A looks like
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(11) ··· (ks) ··· (KS) 1 ··· s ··· S 1 ··· k ··· K p
(11) 1 · · · 0 · · · 0 1 · · · 0 · · · 0 −1 · · · 0 · · · 0 − logp11          
(ks) 0 · · · 1 · · · 0 0 · · · 1 · · · 0 0 · · · −1 · · · 0 − logpks          
(KS) 0 · · · 0 · · · 1 0 · · · 0 · · · 1 0 · · · 0 · · · −1 − logpKS
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Consider the system A · u = 0. If there are numbers solving (9), then these
define a solution u ∈ RK×S+S+K+1 for which the last component is 1. If, on the
other hand, there is a solution u ∈RK×S+S+K+1 to the system A · u= 0 in which
the last component (uK×S+S+K+1) is strictly positive, then by dividing through
by the last component of u, we obtain numbers that solve (9).
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In second place, we write the system of inequalities (10) in matrix form.
There is one row in B for each pair (k s) and (k′ s′) for which xks > x
k′
s′ . In
the row corresponding to xks > x
k′
s′ , we have zeroes everywhere with the excep-
tion of a −1 in the column for (k s) and a 1 in the column for (k′ s′). Let B
be the number of rows of B.
In third place, we have a matrix E that captures the requirement that the last
component of a solution be strictly positive. The matrix E has a single row and
K × S + S +K + 1 columns. It has zeroes everywhere except for 1 in the last
column.
To sum up, there is a solution to system (9) and (10) if and only if there is a
vector u ∈ RK×S+S+K+1 that solves the system of equations and linear inequali-
ties
S1 :
{
A · u= 0
B · u≥ 0
E · u 0
Note that E · u is a scalar, so the last inequality is the same as E · u > 0.
The entries of A, B, and E are either 0, 1, or −1, with the exception of
the last column of A. Under the hypotheses of the lemma we are proving,
the last column consists of rational numbers. By Lemma 9, then, there is such
a solution u to S1 if and only if there is no vector (θηπ) ∈ QK×S+B+1 that
solves the system of equations and linear inequalities
S2 :
{
θ ·A+η ·B+π ·E = 0
η≥ 0
π > 0
In the following discussion, we shall prove that the nonexistence of a solution
u implies that the data set must violate SARSEU. Suppose then that there is
no solution u and let (θηπ) be a rational vector as above, solving system S2.
By multiplying (θηπ) by any positive integer, we obtain new vectors that
solve S2, so we can take (θηπ) to be integer vectors.
Henceforth, we use the following notational convention: For a matrix D with
K × S + S +K + 1 columns, write D1 for the submatrix of D corresponding to
the first K×S columns; let D2 be the submatrix corresponding to the following
S columns; let D3 correspond to the next K columns; and let D4 correspond to
the last column. Thus, D= [D1|D2|D3|D4].
CLAIM 14: We have (i) θ ·A1 +η ·B1 = 0, (ii) θ ·A2 = 0, (iii) θ ·A3 = 0, and
(iv) θ ·A4 +π ·E4 = 0.
PROOF: Since θ ·A+ η · B+ π ·E = 0, then θ ·Ai + η · Bi + π ·Ei = 0 for
all i = 1    4. Moreover, since B2, B3, B4, E1, E2, and E3 are zero matrices,
we obtain the claim. Q.E.D.
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We transform the matrices A and B using θ and η. Define a matrix A∗
from A by letting A∗ have the same number of columns as A and including
(i) θr copies of the rth row when θr > 0, (ii) omitting row r when θr = 0, and
(iii) θr copies of the rth row multiplied by −1 when θr < 0. We refer to rows
that are copies of some r with θr > 0 as original rows and refer to those that are
copies of some r with θr < 0 as converted rows.
Similarly, we define the matrix B∗ from B by including the same columns as
B and ηr copies of each row (and thus omitting row r when ηr = 0; recall that
ηr ≥ 0 for all r).
CLAIM 15: For any (k s), all the entries in the column for (k s) in A∗1 are of
the same sign.
PROOF: By definition of A, the column for (k s) will have zero in all its
entries with the exception of the row for (k s). In A∗, for each (k s), there
are three mutually exclusive possibilities: the row for (k s) in A can (i) not
appear in A∗, (ii) appear as original, or (iii) appear as converted. This shows
the claim. Q.E.D.
CLAIM 16: There exists a sequence (xkisi  x
k′i
s′i
)n
∗
i=1 of pairs that satisfies condi-
tion (i) in SARSEU.
PROOF: Define X = {xks |k ∈Ks ∈ S}. We define such a sequence by induc-
tion. Let B1 = B∗. Given Bi, define Bi+1 as follows. Denote by >i the binary
relation on X defined by z >i z′ if z > z′ and there is at least one copy of a row
corresponding to z > z′ in Bi: there is at least one pair (k s) and (k′ s′) for
which (i) xks > x
k′
s′ , (ii) z = xks and z′ = xk′s′ , and (iii) the row corresponding to
xks > x
k′
s′ in B had strictly positive weight in η.
The binary relation >i cannot exhibit cycles because >i ⊆>. There is, there-
fore, at least one sequence zi1     z
i
Li
in X such that zij >i zij+1 for all j =
1    Li − 1 and with the property that there is no z ∈ X with z >i zi1 or
ziLi >
i z.
Observe that Bi has at least one row corresponding to zij >
i zij+1 for all j =
1    Li − 1. Let the matrix Bi+1 be defined as the matrix obtained from Bi by
omitting one copy of a row corresponding to zij > z
i
j+1 for each j = 1    Li−1.
The matrix Bi+1 has strictly fewer rows than Bi. There is, therefore, n∗ for
which Bn∗+1 would have no rows. The matrix Bn∗ has rows, and the procedure
of omitting rows from Bn∗ will remove all rows of Bn∗ .
Define a sequence (xkisi  x
k′i
s′i
)n
∗
i=1 of pairs by letting x
ki
si
= zi1 and xk
′
i
s′i
= ziLi . Note
that, as a result, xkisi > x
k′i
s′i
for all i. Therefore, the sequence (xkisi  x
k′i
s′i
)n
∗
i=1 of pairs
satisfies condition (i) in SARSEU. Q.E.D.
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We shall use the sequence (xkisi  x
k′i
s′i
)n
∗
i=1 of pairs as our candidate violation of
SARSEU.
Consider a sequence of matrices Ai, i = 1     n∗, defined as follows. Let
A1 =A∗, B1 = B∗, and C1 = [A1
B1
]
. Observe that the rows of C1 add to the null
vector by Claim 14.
We shall proceed by induction. Suppose that Ai has been defined and that
the rows of Ci = [Ai
Bi
]
add to the null vector.
Recall the definition of the sequence xkisi = zi1 > · · · > ziLi = x
k′i
s′i
. There is no
z ∈X with z >i zi1 or ziLi >i z, so for the rows of Ci to add to zero there must be
a −1 in Ai1 in the column corresponding to (k′i s′i) and a 1 in Ai1 in the column
corresponding to (ki si). Let ri be a row in Ai corresponding to (ki si) and let
r ′i be a row corresponding to (k
′
i s
′
i). The existence of a −1 in Ai1 in the column
corresponding to (k′i s
′
i) and a 1 in A
i
1 in the column corresponding to (ki si)
ensures that ri and r ′i exist. Note that the row r
′
i is a converted row while ri is
original. Let Ai+1 be defined from Ai by deleting the two rows, ri and r ′i .
CLAIM 17: The sum of ri, r ′i , and the rows of B
i that are deleted when forming
Bi+1 (corresponding to the pairs zij > z
i
j+1, j = 1    Li−1) add to the null vector.
PROOF: Recall that zij >
i zij+1 for all j = 1    Li − 1. So when we add rows
corresponding to zij >
i zij+1 and z
i
j+1 >
i zij+2, then the entries in the column for
(k s) with xks = zij+1 cancel out and the sum is zero in that entry. Thus, when we
add the rows of Bi that are not in Bi+1, we obtain a vector that is 0 everywhere
except the columns corresponding to zi1 and z
i
Li
. This vector cancels out with
ri + r ′i , by definition of ri and r ′i . Q.E.D.
CLAIM 18: The matrixA∗ can be partitioned into pairs of rows (ri r ′i) in which
the rows r ′i are converted and the rows ri are original.
PROOF: For each i, Ai+1 differs from Ai in that the rows ri and r ′i are re-
moved from Ai to form Ai+1. We shall prove that A∗ is composed of the 2n∗
rows ri and r ′i .
First note that since the rows of Ci add up to the null vector, and Ai+1 and
Bi+1 are obtained from Ai and Bi by removing a collection of rows that add up
to zero, then the rows of Ci+1 must add up to zero as well.
We now show that the process stops after n∗ steps: all the rows in Cn∗ are
removed by the procedure described above. By way of contradiction, suppose
that there exist rows left after removing rn∗ and r ′n∗ . Then, by the argument
above, the rows of the matrix Cn∗+1 must add to the null vector. If there are
rows left, then the matrix Cn∗+1 is well defined.
By definition of the sequence Bi, however, Bn∗+1 is an empty matrix. Hence,
rows remaining in An
∗+1
1 must add up to zero. By Claim 15, the entries of a
SAVAGE IN THE MARKET 1489
column (k s) of A∗ are always of the same sign. Moreover, each row of A∗
has a nonzero element in the first K × S columns. Therefore, no subset of the
columns of A∗1 can sum to the null vector. Q.E.D.
CLAIM 19: (i) For any k and s, if (ki si) = (k s) for some i, then the row
corresponding to (k s) appears as original in A∗. Similarly, if (k′i s
′
i)= (k s) for
some i, then the row corresponding to (k s) appears converted in A∗.
(ii) If the row corresponding to (k s) appears as original in A∗, then there is
some i with (ki si)= (k s). Similarly, if the row corresponding to (k s) appears
converted in A∗, then there is i with (k′i s
′
i)= (k s).
PROOF: Part (i) is true by definition of (xkisi  x
k′i
s′i
). Part (ii) is immediate from
Claim 18 because if the row corresponding to (k s) appears original in A∗,
then it equals ri for some i and then (ki si)= (k s). The result is similar when
the row appears converted. Q.E.D.
CLAIM 20: The sequence (xkisi  x
k′i
s′i
)n
∗
i=1 satisfies conditions (ii) and (iii) in
SARSEU.
PROOF: By Claim 14(ii), the rows of A∗2 add up to zero. Therefore, the num-
ber of times that s appears in an original row equals the number of times that it
appears in a converted row. By Claim 19, then, the number of times s appears
as si equals the number of times it appears as s′i. Therefore condition (ii) in the
axiom is satisfied.
Similarly, by Claim 14(iii), the rows of A∗3 add to the null vector. Therefore,
the number of times that k appears in an original row equals the number of
times that it appears in a converted row. By Claim 19, then, the number of
times that k appears as ki equals the number of times it appears as k′i. There-
fore, condition (iii) in the axiom is satisfied. Q.E.D.
Finally, in the following, we show that
∏n∗
i=1
p
ki
si
p
k′
i
s′
i
> 1, which finishes the proof
of Lemma 11, as the sequence (xkisi  x
k′i
s′i
)n
∗
i=1 would then exhibit a violation of
SARSEU.
CLAIM 21: We have
∏n∗
i=1
p
ki
si
p
k′
i
s′
i
> 1.
PROOF: By Claim 14(iv) and the fact that the submatrix E4 equals the
scalar 1, we obtain
0 = θ ·A4 +πE4 =
(
n∗∑
i=1
(
ri + r ′i
))
4
+π
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where (
∑n∗
i=1(ri + r ′i))4 is the (scalar) sum of the entries of A∗4. Recall that
− logpkisi is the last entry of row ri and that logp
k′i
s′i
is the last entry of
row r ′i , as r
′
i is converted and ri is original. Therefore, the sum of the
rows of A∗4 are
∑n∗
i=1 log(p
k′i
s′i
/pkisi ). Then
∑n∗
i=1 log(p
k′i
s′i
/pkisi ) = −π < 0. Thus,∏n∗
i=1
p
ki
si
p
k′
i
s′
i
> 1. Q.E.D.
A.2.2. Proof of Lemma 12
For each sequence σ = (xkisi  x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 that satisfies conditions (i), (ii), and (iii)
in SARSEU, we define a vector tσ ∈ NK2S2 . For each pair (xkisi  x
k′i
s′i
), we shall
identify the pair with ((ki si) (k′i s
′
i)). Let tσ((k s) (k
′ s′)) be the number of
times that the pair (xks  x
k′
s′ ) appears in the sequence σ . One can then describe
the satisfaction of SARSEU by means of the vectors tσ . Define
T = {tσ ∈NK2S2 |σ satisfies conditions (i), (ii), (iii) in SARSEU}
Observe that the set T depends only on (xk)Kk=1 in the data set (x
kpk)Kk=1. It
does not depend on prices.
For each ((k s) (k′ s′)) such that xks > x
k′
s′ , define δˆ((k s) (k
′ s′)) =
log( p
k
s
pk
′
s′
) and define δˆ((k s) (k′ s′)) = 0 when xks ≤ xk′s′ . Then δˆ is a K2S2-
dimensional real-valued vector. If σ = (xkisi  x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1, then
δˆ · tσ =
∑
((ks)(k′s′))∈(KS)2
δˆ
(
(k s)
(
k′ s′
))
tσ
(
(k s)
(
k′ s′
))
= log
(
n∏
i=1
pkisi
p
k′i
s′i
)

So the data set satisfies SARSEU if and only if δˆ · t ≤ 0 for all t ∈ T .
Enumerate the elements in X in increasing order: y1 < y2 < · · ·< yN and fix
an arbitrary
¯
ξ ∈ (01). We shall construct by induction a sequence {(εks (n))}Nn=1,
where εks (n) is defined for all (k s) with x
k
s = yn.
By the denseness of the rational numbers and the continuity of the ex-
ponential function, for each (k s) such that xks = y1, there exists a positive
number εks (1) such that log(p
k
s ε
k
s (1)) ∈ Q and ¯
ξ < εks (1) < 1. Let ε(1) =
min{εks (1)|xks = y1}.
In second place, for each (k s) such that xks = y2, there exists a positive
εks (2) such that log(p
k
s ε
k
s (2)) ∈Q and ¯
ξ < εks (2) < ε(1). Let ε(2)= min{εks (2)|
xks = y2}.
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In third place, and reasoning by induction, suppose that ε(n) has been de-
fined and that
¯
ξ < ε(n). For each (k s) such that xks = yn+1, let εks (n+ 1) > 0
be such that log(pks ε
k
s (n+ 1)) ∈ Q and ¯
ξ < εks (n+ 1) < ε(n). Let ε(n+ 1) =
min{εks (n+ 1)|xks = yn}.
This defines the sequence (εks (n)) by induction. Note that ε
k
s (n+1)/ε(n) < 1
for all n. Let ξ¯ < 1 be such that εks (n+ 1)/ε(n) < ξ¯.
For each k ∈K and s ∈ S, let qks = pks εks (n), where n is such that xks = yn. We
claim that the data set (xkqk)Kk=1 satisfies SARSEU. Let δ
∗ be defined from
(qk)Kk=1 in the same manner as δˆ was defined from (p
k)Kk=1.
For each pair ((k s) (k′ s′)) with xks > x
k′
s′ , if n and m are such that x
k
s = yn
and xk′s′ = ym, then n >m. By definition of ε,
εks (n)
εk
′
s′ (m)
<
εks (n)
ε(m)
< ξ¯ < 1
Hence,
δ∗
(
(k s)
(
k′ s′
))= log pks εks (n)
pk
′
s′ ε
k′
s′ (m)
< log
pks
pk
′
s′
+ log ξ¯ < log p
k
s
pk
′
s′
= δˆ(xks xk′s′ )
Thus, for all t ∈ T , δ∗ · t ≤ δˆ · t ≤ 0, as t ≥ 0 and the data set (xkpk)Kk=1 satisfies
SARSEU. Thus, the data set (xkqk)Kk=1 satisfies SARSEU. Finally, note that
¯
ξ < εks (n) < 1 for all n and each k ∈ K, s ∈ S. So that by choosing ¯
ξ close
enough to 1, we can take the prices (qk) to be as close to (pk) as desired.
A.2.3. Proof of Lemma 13
Consider the system comprised by (9) and (10) in the proof of Lemma 11.
Let A, B, and E be constructed from the data set as in the proof of Lemma 11.
The difference with respect to Lemma 11 is that now the entries of A4 may not
be rational. Note that the entries of E, B, and Ai, i= 123, are rational.
Suppose, toward a contradiction, that there is no solution to the system com-
prised by (9) and (10). Then, by the argument in the proof of Lemma 11, there
is no solution to system S1. Lemma 8 with F = R implies that there is a real
vector (θηπ) such that θ ·A+η ·B+π ·E = 0 and η≥ 0, π > 0. Recall that
B4 = 0 and E4 = 1, so we obtain that θ ·A4 +π = 0.
Let (qk)Kk=1 be vectors of prices such that the data set (x
kqk)Kk=1 satisfies
SARSEU and logqks ∈ Q for all k and s. (Such (qk)Kk=1 exists by Lemma 12.)
Construct matrices A′, B′, and E′ from this data set in the same way as A, B,
and E is constructed in the proof of Lemma 11. Note that only the prices are
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different in (xkqk) compared to (xkpk). So E′ = E, B′ = B, and A′i =Ai for
i = 123. Since only prices qk are different in this data set, only A′4 may be
different from A4.
By Lemma 12, we can choose prices qk such that |θ · A′4 − θ · A4| < π/2.
We have shown that θ · A4 = −π, so the choice of prices qk guarantees that
θ ·A′4 < 0. Let π ′ = −θ ·A′4 > 0.
Note that θ ·A′i +η ·B′i + π ′Ei = 0 for i= 123, as (θηπ) solves system
S2 for matrices A, B, and E, and A′i = Ai, B′i = Bi, and Ei = 0 for i = 123.
Finally, B4 = 0, so θ ·A′4 +η ·B′4 +π ′E4 = θ ·A′4 +π ′ = 0. We also have that η≥
0 and π ′ > 0. Therefore, θ, η, and π ′ constitute a solution to S2 for matrices
A′, B′, and E′.
Lemma 8 then implies that there is no solution to S1 for matrices A′, B′,
and E′. So there is no solution to the system comprised by (9) and (10) in the
proof of Lemma 11. However, this contradicts Lemma 11 because the data set
(xkqk) satisfies SARSEU and logqks ∈Q for all k= 1    K and s = 1     S.
APPENDIX B: SUBJECTIVE–OBJECTIVE EXPECTED UTILITY
We turn to an environment in which a subset of states have known probabil-
ities. Let S∗ ⊆ S be a set of states and assume given μ∗s , the probability of state
s for s ∈ S∗.
We allow for the two extreme cases: S∗ = S when all states are objective and
we are in the setup of Green and Srivastava (1986), Varian (1983), and Kubler,
Selden, and Wei (2014), or S∗ = ∅, which is the situation in the body of our
paper. The case when S∗ is a singleton is studied experimentally by Ahn et al.
(2014) and Bossaerts et al. (2010).
DEFINITION 4: A data set (xkpk)Kk=1 is subjective–objective expected utility
rational (SOEU rational) if there is μ ∈ Δ++, η> 0, and a concave and strictly
increasing function u : R+ → R such that for all s ∈ S∗, μs = ημ∗s and for all
k ∈K,
y ∈ B(pkpk · xk) ⇒ ∑
s∈S
μsu(ys)≤
∑
s∈S
μsu
(
xks
)

In the definition above, η is a parameter that captures the difference in how
the agent treats objective and subjective probabilities. Note that since η is con-
stant, relative objective probabilities (the ratio of the probability of one state in
S∗ to another) is unaffected by η. The presence of η has the result, in studies
with a single objective state (as in Ahn et al. and Bossaerts et al.), of rendering
the objective state subjective.
In studies of objective expected utility, a crucial aspect of the data set is the
price-probability ratios, or “risk-neutral prices,” defined as follows: for k ∈ K
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and s ∈ S∗, ρks = p
k
s
μ∗s
. Let rks = pks if s /∈ S∗ and rks = ρks if s ∈ S∗. The following
modification of SARSEU characterizes SOEU rationality.
STRONG AXIOM OF REVEALED SUBJECTIVE–OBJECTIVE EXPECTED UTIL-
ITY (SARSOEU): Assume any sequence of pairs (xkisi  x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 in which the fol-
lowing statements hold:
(i) We have xkisi > x
k′i
s′i
for all i.
(ii) For each s /∈ S∗, s appears as si (on the left of the pair) the same number
of times it appears as s′i (on the right).
(iii) Each k appears as ki (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it
appears as k′i (on the right).
Then
∏n
i=1(r
ki
si
/r
k′i
s′i
)≤ 1.
Note that SARSEU is a special case of SARSOEU when S∗ = ∅ and when
S∗ is a singleton (as in Ahn et al. and Bossaerts et al.).
THEOREM 22: A data set is SOEU rational if and only if it satisfies SARSOEU.
For completeness, we write out the SARSOEU for the case when S∗ = S.
STRONG AXIOM OF REVEALED OBJECTIVE EXPECTED UTILITY (SAROEU):
Assume any sequence of pairs (xkisi  x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 in which the following statements hold:
(i) We have xkisi > x
k′i
s′i
for all i.
(ii) Each k appears in ki (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it
appears in k′i (on the right).
Then the product of price-probability ratios satisfies that
∏n
i=1(ρ
ki
si
/ρ
k′i
s′i
)≤ 1.
The proof of Theorem 22 with additional discussions is given in the Supple-
mental Material.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Let Σ = {(k sk′ s′) ∈ K × S ×K × S : xks > xk′s′ } and let δ ∈ RΣ be defined
by δσ = (logpks − logpk′s′ ). Define a (K+ S)× |Σ| matrix G as follows: G has a
row for each k ∈K and for each s ∈ S, and G has a column for each σ ∈ Σ. The
entry for row kˆ ∈K and column σ = (k sk′ s′) is 1 if kˆ= k, it is −1 if kˆ= k′,
and it is 0 otherwise. The entry for row sˆ ∈ S and column σ = (k sk′ s′) is 1
if sˆ = s, it is −1 if sˆ = s′, and it is 0 otherwise.
Note that every sequence (xkisi  x
k′i
s′i
)ni=1 in the conditions of SARSEU can be
identified with a vector t ∈ ZΣ+ such that t · δ > 0 and G · t = 0.
1494 F. ECHENIQUE AND K. SAITO
Consider the statements
∃t ∈ ZΣ+ s.t. G · t = 0 and t · δ > 0(11)
∃t ∈QΣ+ s.t. G · t = 0 and t · δ > 0(12)
∃t ∈RΣ+ s.t. G · t = 0 and t · δ > 0(13)
∃t ∈ [0N]Σ s.t. G · t = 0 and t · δ > 0(14)
where N > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily. We show that (11) ⇔ (12) ⇔ (13) ⇔
(14). The proof follows because there are efficient algorithms to decide (14)
(see, e.g., Chapter 8 in Papadimitriou and Steiglitz (1998)).
That (11) ⇔ (12) and (13) ⇔ (14) is true because if t · δ > 0 and G · t = 0,
then for any scalar λ, (λt) · δ > 0 and G · (λt)= 0.
To show that (12) ⇔ (13), we proceed as follows. Obviously (12) ⇒ (13);
we focus on the converse. Note that the entries of G are rational numbers
(in fact, they are 1, −1, or 0). Then one can show that the null space of the
linear transformation defined by G, namely Ω = {t ∈ RΣ : G · t = 0}, has a ra-
tional basis (qh)Hh=1. Suppose that (13) is true, and let t
∗ ∈ RΣ+ be such that
G · t∗ = 0 and t∗ ·δ > 0. Then t∗ =∑Hh=1 αhqh for some coefficients (αh)Hh=1. The
linear function (α′h)
H
h=1 →
∑H
h=1 α
′
hqh is continuous and onto Ω. For any neigh-
borhood B of t∗ in Ω, B intersects the strictly positive orthant in Ω, which
is open in Ω. Therefore, there are rational α′h such that
∑H
h=1 α
′
hqh ≥ 0 and
(α′h)
H
h=1 can be taken arbitrarily close to (αh)
H
h=1. Since t
∗ · δ > 0, we can take
(α′h)
H
h=1 to be rational and such that
∑H
h=1 α
′
hqh ≥ 0 and δ ·
∑H
h=1 α
′
hqh > 0. Let-
ting t =∑Hh=1 α′hqh establishes (12).
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